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Abstract
Recent studies highlight that economic expectations are a crucial determinant of citi-
zens’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD). This article relies on a cross-sectional analy-
sis of European survey data collected in the aftermath of COVID-19 disease to investi-
gate the relationship between citizens’ expectations about future economic prospects and 
their SWD. Our findings support the idea that citizens’ expectations about future economic 
prospects are correlated with SWD. Furthermore, they reveal that perceived conditions of 
material wellbeing moderate this relationship.
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1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the spread of the COVID-19 virus put democracies under 
pressure (e.g., Bol et al., 2020; Flinders, 2020). Many European agencies and think tanks 
have launched surveys to investigate the possible implications of the pandemic across 
Europe (e.g., Eurofound; European Council on Foreign Relations—ECFR),1 exploring 
how the outbreak has shaped European citizens’ attitudes toward the governing authorities. 
This topic is considered highly relevant because “the coronavirus is already reshaping the 
debate about regime legitimacy and state capacity” (Flinders, 2020 p. 17).
In this turbulent context, an inquiry into citizens’ attitudes towards democracy is 
deemed essential, especially in Europe, where dissatisfaction with democracy seems to 
rise (Kriesi, 2020). In detail, the choice of exploring people’s satisfaction with democracy 
(SWD) would make much sense because this latter “is probably the most important ele-
ment for the success of a democratic system” (Chang, 2018, p. 999).
In line with this perspective, our paper uses data collected during the pandemic to 
examine the correlates of citizens’ SWD. More specifically, by using cross-sectional micro-
data collected by Eurofound (2020) in its survey of European citizens’ living and working 
conditions in the wake of COVID-19, our investigation aims to assess whether individuals’ 
prospective expectations about their economic situation are correlated with their SWD.
The motivation of such a focus on the link between expectations about future economic 
prospects and SWD is two-fold. On the one hand, while there is broad consensus about the 
idea that economic conditions matter for democracy (Dahl, 1989; Lipset, 1994), specific 
evidence on the link between individual expectations about the economy and SWD remains 
limited, even if attention for this topic is increasing (Loveless & Binelli, 2020; Nadeau 
et al., 2019). On the other hand, a growing body of research reveals that the pandemic had 
massive effects on economic sentiment and expectations (e.g., Fetzer et al., 2020), which 
suggests checking whether these expectations, in turn, exert any influence on SWD.
As far as we know, this paper is one of the first attempts to explore the importance of 
expectations about future economic prospects on SWD in the context of the COVID-19 
outbreak. By testing the link between these two variables, our analysis controls for govern-
ment support measures directed towards citizens and for trust in institutions, which allows 
us to provide additional findings that contribute to the discussion on the role of policy deci-
sions and evaluations of institutions in explaining political attitudes during the COVID-19 
pandemic (Bol et al., 2020; Naumann et al., 2020; Schraff, 2020).
The paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the most recent literature 
relevant to our study. Section three presents the data and methodology applied to analyze 
them. Section four presents our findings. Finally, Section five provides the results’ discus-
sion and conclusion.
1 https:// ecfr. eu/ publi cation/ toget her_ in_ trauma_ europ eans_ and_ the_ world_ after_ covid_ 19/ [accessed 
on 15/9/2020]; https:// www. eurof ound. europa. eu/ publi catio ns/ report/ 2020/ living- worki ng- and- covid- 19 
[accessed on 6/11/2020].
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2  Background and hypotheses
Scholars claim that objective economic conditions and their subjective perception have a 
remarkable impact on citizens’ SWD (Quaranta & Martini, 2016 and 2017; Christmann & 
Torcal, 2017; Daoust & Nadeau, 2020).
The most recent literature adds that citizens’ prospective economic expectations are also 
crucial SWD drivers. Nadeau et al. (2019) develop a forward-looking theory that is primar-
ily rooted in the behavioral economics models of expectations’ formation and the “pros-
pect of upward mobility” (POUM) hypothesis (Benabou & Oak, 2001). According to them, 
people who expect to experience better economic conditions are characterized by a sort of 
“wishful thinking” and have an “optimism bias” or “positive illusions,” which make them 
more prone to a positive evaluation of institutional performance. This thesis is supported 
by an empirical exercise–based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 
survey data–showing that a relationship between citizens’ expectations about future eco-
nomic prospects and their evaluation of democracy performance exists and is conditioned 
by individual wealth.
In the same line of research, Loveless and Binelli (2020) analyze jobless skilled young 
Italian individuals and find that expectations about future economic prospects—i.e., about 
job stability, job security, and earnings—affect their satisfaction with the way democracy 
works in the country.
This strand of research has gained significant relevance during the COVID-19 crisis 
since the pandemic had a remarkable impact on people’s sense of economic vulnerability 
and produced effects on economic perceptions and expectations (Fetzer et al., 2020; Mann 
et al., 2020). In such a context, an inspection of the strength of the link between expecta-
tions about future economic prospects and SWD seems particularly appropriate. Surpris-
ingly, the literature that explored the drivers of citizens’ political support during the pan-
demic has not considered the role of prospective economic expectations in influencing the 
opinions about institutional performance (e.g., Bol et al., 2020; Schraff, 2020).
Drawing on the SWD research recalled above, we formulate the following hypothesis to 
be tested in our empirical analysis:
H1 Optimistic (pessimistic) expectations about future economic prospects exert a posi-
tive (negative) impact on citizens’ opinions regarding the performance of a democratic 
system (the prospective economic evaluation hypothesis).
Scholars have added to this picture by suggesting that material wellbeing moderates the 
effect of economic expectations on SWD. “The intuition is straightforward: material gain 
should matter more to the poor because it leads to a larger (relative) improvement in living 
standards for them than for the already rich” (Nadeau et al., 2019, p. 1081). Conversely, 
bad economic prospects should decrease SWD more among the poor. In other words, we 
expect the effect of prospective economic consequences on SWD not to be homogeneous 
across individuals but to vary according to subjective economic conditions. We, therefore, 
formulate the following additional hypothesis:
H2 The effect of expectations about future economic prospects on SWD is greater 
among poorer people.
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To study the ceteris paribus link between economic prospects and SWD, our analysis must 
consider the role of trust in governing authorities and the effect of support measures on 
SWD. Citizens’ support of the performance of a democratic regime is highly sensitive to 
different institutional contexts (Linde & Ekman, 2003). The inclusion of trust as a possible 
correlate of SWD can, thus, be justified in the light of the input-oriented procedural model 
of regime support, where “support is based on trust in democratic institutions as well as 
participation in the democratic process” (Hoboldt, 2012, p. 93). Earlier studies already 
document a positive correlation between trust in institutions and SWD (e.g., Hoboldt, 
2012; Christmann & Torcal, 2017); trust appears as a significant predictor of SWD in 
times of crisis (Vlachová, 2019). A recent and still growing COVID-19 related literature 
confirms the decisive role of trust in governing institutions in conditioning citizen evalua-
tions of government activity during the pandemic (Devine et al., 2020; Altiparmakis et al., 
2021). The motivation lies in the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, which, playing as a “mecha-
nism of retrospective performance evaluation” of the policies adopted in response to the 
coronavirus crisis, is found to affect citizens’ democratic attitudes (Bol et al., 2020, p.2). 
Increased perceptions of threats “shape the dynamics of public opinion” (Kritzinger et al., 
2021, p. 1223). On the one hand, increased trust in government is a consequence of the 
empowerment of leaders as a bulwark against the virus-related threats when citizens ask 
for more protection (Bækgaard et al., 2020). On the other hand, it also represents people’s 
solutions to offset the uncertainty and distress related to the pandemic turmoil (Kritzinger 
et al., 2021).
According to the output-oriented performance model of regime support (Hoboldt, 
2012), SWD may depend on how citizens evaluate government performance. In the context 
of coronavirus disease, as governments were asked to adopt response measures to tackle 
the crisis’s adverse effects, performance evaluation is, thus, related to citizens’ assessment 
of government responses to COVID-19 (Altiparmakis et  al., 2021). In detail, the adop-
tion of support measures, shaping the way people think about the pandemic, is supposed 
to affect people’s risk perception and capacity to bear the effects of the disease (Naumann 
et al., 2020, p. 2). A citizen who is a recipient of a support measure is more likely to judge 
how democracy works in his country positively. Furthermore, the better people rate the 
government responses, the higher their reported satisfaction with democracy is. “Policy 
evaluations are part and parcel of democratic representation”, they contribute to a more 
compliant attitude over time by citizens, which is the core ingredient of success (Altipar-
makis et al., 2021, p. 1162). This, in turn, conditions the regime’s legitimacy, which “is 
largely determined by its effectiveness to deliver goods to the public” (Linde & Ekman, 
2003, p. 400). As citizens asked governments to provide an adequate set of public goods 
to counteract the consequences of the pandemic, once such goods were delivered, the more 
effective a government was at delivering such goods, the better the people valued the per-
formance of democracy.
3  Data and methodology
Our analysis relies on the micro-data provided by round two of the Eurofound’s “Living, 
Working and COVID-19” survey (2020), carried out in the EU27 countries between June 
and July 2020.
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Since respondents were recruited via uncontrolled convenience sampling (2020),2 all 
the individual responses were re-weighted to represent each respondent’s country’s demo-
graphic. Following Eurofund’s instructions, we used the weight provided by the dataset 
(w_gross_trim). According to the dataset codebook, the provided weights “can be used for 
both within-country and cross-country analysis” (Sandor, 2020, p.1).
The survey includes one question asking respondents to indicate their SWD in their 
country, our dependent variable. Replies are coded by one ordered variable whose values 
range from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). This original variable has been re-
coded into three categories (low, medium, high satisfaction) to ease the interpretation of 
our results.3
The observed ith respondent SWD is modeled as a function of two main variables: eco-
nomic_prospects and spending_ability.
Expectations about future economic_prospects is a categorical variable that measures 
whether the respondent feels that his/her household financial situation in three months will 
be better, the same, or worse than it is at present. We expect that better economic prospects 
are connected with higher evaluations of democracy performance.
Spending ability is one ordinal variable measuring the respondents’ household’s ability 
to make ends meet in regular pre-COVID times. This variable should convey information 
on the respondent’s material wellbeing, which is supposed to condition the link between 
individual economic prospects and SWD.4
The analysis considers four groups of control variables. The first group of covariates 
includes socio-demographic controls such as respondent’s age (youth), gender (male), 
household composition (couple, parent_granparents, child_in_hh), education (education), 
employment status (emp_stat, distinguishing among employee, self-employed, unemployed, 
retired, other) and self-perceived health (bad_health).
The second group of variables observes respondents’ financial and living conditions by 
measuring their household’s financial situation during the last three months (worse_house-
holdeconomy) and whether they feel that they would leave their current accommodation 
due to economic problems over the following six months (hou_insec).
The third group includes variables controlling for individual trust in the government 
(trust_gov) and national health system (trust_health), which we argue are essential to com-
plement trust in institutions in the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The fourth group includes the categorical variables that observe respondents’ per-
ceptions about the support measures applied by their national government in the spe-
cific context of the COVID-19 pandemic. More precisely, measures_fair indicates (in 
a range from 1 to 5) the perceived fairness of support measures, and measures_destina-
tary indicates in a range from 1 to 5 how much the respondent agrees with the idea that 
support measures reach those who need them most. These variables concern the assess-
ment of the current government and its intervention. Moreover, this group also includes 
one set of dummies indicating whether the respondent has received any public financial 
2 Specifically “by publishing the link to the survey on social media and distributing it among Eurofound’s 
contacts and stakeholders, complemented by social media advertising, targeting hard-to-reach groups” 
(Sandor and Ahrendt, 2020, p. 1).
3 Where low includes values from 1 to 3, medium from 4 to 7 and high from 8 to 10. Results obtained 
when relying on the original variable are not qualitatively different from those reported in the following 
section. They are not included in the paper to save space but can be requested from the authors.
4 It is worth noting that differently from Nadeau et al. (2019)’s MWB index, our spending_ability variable 
does not distinguish between household income and assets.
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support since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (support_unemp; support_wage; 
support_sickleave; support_payments; support_other). Finally, the analysis considers 
country dummies controlling for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
All the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1, where basic descrip-
tive statistics are also reported. The original survey data include 24,123 observations. 
Unfortunately, some observations report missing values for some of the variables that 
we are interested in. As a consequence of listwise deletion, the sample under scrutiny in 
our analysis has fewer observations (15,073) in some specifications. All the analyses use 
the observations’ weights provided by the “Living, Working and COVID-19” survey to 
ensure that the data represent the countries’ demographic profiles.
Given the ordered nature of our SWD variable, our estimates are carried out through 
an ordered logit model. The cross-sectional nature of our empirical exercise prevents the 
identification of any causal link among the variables. Such cross-sectional studies have 
to face the hurdles of omitted variables, endogeneity, and the potential issue of reverse 
causality. To avoid the omitted variable bias, we choose an extensive set of control vari-
ables related to the outcome (SWD) and our independent variables of interest (Daoust 
& Nadeau, 2020) and include them progressively in our specifications. In this way, if 
the sign and significance of our primary independent variable are consistent among the 
different specifications, we may reasonably discard that our results depend on omitting 
relevant variables.
Previous studies addressed the concern of endogeneity using an instrumental variables 
approach. Economic perceptions have been instrumented with a number of variables, such 
as individual socio-economic status (e.g. race, gender, education, income, interest in poli-
tics, job status and union membership in Lewis-Beck et al., 2008) or macroeconomic fig-
ures (e.g. inflation, GDP growth, unemployment rate in Nadeau & Lewis-Beck, 2001; and 
Bellucci & Lewis-Beck, 2011). It would be hard to sustain that the variables of the first 
group are a valid instrument in our study, as they are directly correlated to SWD (see the 
results for gender, education or employment status in the next section). Macroeconomic 
variables instead, besides they could be also directly correlated to SWD (e.g. worsened 
economic performance may lead to dissatisfaction towards democracy), cannot be included 
in our specification due to the lack of heterogeneity within country. In short, previously 
used instruments fail the exclusion restriction or are not suitable for the present study. 
Therefore, in the absence of a valid instrument, the estimates cannot be interpreted as cas-
ual but just as robust, ceteris paribus correlations.
First of all, generally pessimistic people will tend to report poor economic prospects and 
low SWD. The inclusion of employment status and a variable on declared spending abil-
ity of the respondents, mirroring the objective economic status of the respondents (Lewis-
Beck, 2006), should help downsize the issue of omitted variable. Furthermore, in countries 
where democracy is not working well, that may cause people to believe their economic 
prospects are worse. In times of Covid-19, a possible failure of democracy is considered to 
be highly related to governments’ response measures to the crisis and trust between gover-
nors and the governed (e.g., Bol et al., 2020; Devine et al., 2020, Altiparmakis et al., 2021). 
The inclusion of trust in government variables and respondents’ reception and assessment 
of governmental supporting measures were aimed at smoothing such concerns. Finally, 
where the pandemic was especially bad, governments might have provided more support, 
but democracy may have eroded more. Heterogeneity in epidemiological cases of Covid-
19 should be captured by including country-fixed effects in the model. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of a variable catching the respondent’s health status should also help control the 
incidence of the pandemic at the individual level.
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Table 2  Ordered Logit estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expectations about future economic_prospects
The same − 0.083* − 0.161*** − 0.086 0.027 − 0.127
[0.044] [0.047] [0.055] [0.057] [0.236]
Worse − 0.968*** − 0.785*** − 0.553*** − 0.369*** − 0.791***
[0.050] [0.053] [0.062] [0.065] [0.233]
Employment_status
Employee 0.557*** 0.053 − 0.085 0.052 0.068
[0.052] [0.062] [0.069] [0.074] [0.074]
Self-employed 0.251*** − 0.178** − 0.221** − 0.077 − 0.073
[0.071] [0.079] [0.088] [0.093] [0.093]
Retired 0.721*** 0.258*** − 0.013 0.098 0.113
[0.056] [0.066] [0.076] [0.080] [0.081]
Other 0.564*** 0.103 − 0.155* − 0.143* − 0.120
[0.061] [0.069] [0.080] [0.085] [0.086]
Bad_health − 0.663*** − 0.492*** − 0.275*** − 0.115 − 0.094
[0.055] [0.059] [0.068] [0.072] [0.072]
Secondary education 0.378*** 0.258*** 0.417*** 0.385*** 0.387***
[0.066] [0.072] [0.081] [0.083] [0.084]
Tertiary education 0.675*** 0.430*** 0.556*** 0.358*** 0.363***
[0.069] [0.075] [0.086] [0.088] [0.089]
Youth 0.293*** 0.290*** 0.304*** 0.319*** 0.305***
[0.046] [0.048] [0.058] [0.061] [0.062]
Male − 0.153*** − 0.221*** − 0.189*** − 0.192*** − 0.200***
[0.027] [0.029] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036]
Couple 0.150*** 0.058* 0.041 0.043 0.044
[0.031] [0.032] [0.039] [0.041] [0.041]
Parent_granparents 0.228*** 0.073 0.139** 0.092 0.102*
[0.045] [0.048] [0.056] [0.059] [0.059]
Child_in_hh − 0.037 0.041 0.126*** 0.182*** 0.183***
[0.034] [0.036] [0.041] [0.044] [0.044]
Hou_insec − 0.026 − 0.044 − 0.083 − 0.082
[0.078] [0.086] [0.091] [0.092]
Worsed_householdeconomy − 0.176*** − 0.098** − 0.058 − 0.063
[0.036] [0.042] [0.044] [0.045]
Spending_ability
Difficulty 0.396*** 0.258*** 0.366*** 0.213
[0.069] [0.079] [0.082] [0.256]
Some difficulty 0.544*** 0.231*** 0.364*** 0.079
[0.065] [0.075] [0.078] [0.249]
Fairly easily 1.006*** 0.450*** 0.496*** 0.307
[0.067] [0.077] [0.080] [0.240]
Easily 1.117*** 0.528*** 0.452*** 0.112
[0.071] [0.082] [0.086] [0.239]
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Table 2  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very easily 1.236*** 0.530*** 0.497*** 0.006
[0.077] [0.091] [0.095] [0.251]
Support_unemp − 0.179** − 0.401*** − 0.608*** − 0.608***
[0.070] [0.077] [0.082] [0.082]
Support_wage 0.234*** 0.057 0.023 0.008
[0.063] [0.070] [0.074] [0.074]
Support_sickleave 0.473*** 0.502*** 0.668*** 0.664***
[0.076] [0.088] [0.094] [0.094]
Support_other 0.421*** 0.504*** 0.275*** 0.296***
[0.072] [0.081] [0.086] [0.087]
Support_payments 0.370*** 0.043 0.028 0.050
The same#difficulty [0.069] [0.077] [0.081] [0.081]
− 0.189
The same#some difficulty [0.285]
0.068

















_cons − 0.852*** − 0.680*** − 2.867*** − 0.671*** − 0.953***
[0.128] [0.145] [0.205] [0.219] [0.300]
_cons 1.386*** 1.643*** − 0.199 2.902*** 2.627***
[0.129] [0.146] [0.203] [0.222] [0.302]
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R2 Adj 0.102 0.103 0.200 0.323 0.325
N 20,620 19,370 15,084 15,073 15,073
Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable is an ordered variable measuring 
satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and ranging from 1 (low) to 3 (high)
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1
 E. De Simone et al.
1 3
4  Results
4.1  Main findings
Table 2 shows the estimates obtained through our regression analyses. Five specifications 
are reported. In model (1), we test H1 by including individuals’ expectations about future 
economic prospects as regressors alongside the entire set of socio-demographic controls. 
To test the robustness of the findings obtained through this model, we include additional 
covariates in the (2)–(4) specifications. In model (2), we add the spending ability variable 
alongside covariates controlling economic prospects and socio-demographics. Model (3) 
adds the variables observing the respondents’ perception of government policy measures, 
while model (4) includes the trust-related covariates. Finally, to test H2, in model (5), the 
interaction between respondents’ expectations about future economic prospects and spend-
ing ability is explored.
Looking at the estimates, the first evident result is that we find a statistically signifi-
cant (p < 0.001) negative correlation between pessimistic economic expectations about 
economic prospects and SWD. In other words, having the feeling that in three months 
the household financial situation will be worse than today (instead than better than today) 
translates into lower SWD. This finding is highly consistent across the models and strongly 
supports H1. In specifications (1 and 2), we also find that those who feel that their future 
economic condition will be unaltered compared with today report a lower SWD than those 
who are optimistic. Also this finding is consistent with H1, but is not confirmed by the 
other specifications.
Fig. 1  Predicted probability of SWD (low-medium–high) at different levels of expectations about future 
economic prospects (First, second, third, and fourth specification)
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In Fig. 1 we plot the predicted probabilities of SWD for the different levels of economic 
prospects (better, the same, worse) as resulting from the estimation of model (4). These 
figures show that generally a medium SWD is the most likely outcome. As the economic 
prospects worsen, the predicted probability of low SWD increases, becoming the highest 
(specification 1) or about equal to medium SWD (specification 2, 3, and 4). Instead, the 
predicted probability of a high SWD decreases as the economic prospects worsen, reaching 
a minimum of about 0.15 in all four specifications. Therefore, all else equal, a shift from 
better to worse economic prospects decreases the likelihood of expressing high SWD and a 
corresponding increase of expressing low SWD.
Two additional findings are worth noting. First, the effect of expectations about future 
economic prospects on the probability of showing an intermediate SWD (SWD = medium) 
seems less remarkable. Second, while the magnitude of the worse impact on SWD is size-
able in our more parsimonious models, our more complete specification, especially when 
trust in institutions is considered an additional covariate (model 4), suggests that it is less 
remarkable.
On the whole, these estimates support the idea that during the COVID-19 crisis, pes-
simistic feelings about economic prospects lead to dissatisfaction with democracy. This is 
particularly true when we assess moving from good (better) to bad (worse) prospects.
4.2  Other findings
The results obtained for the control variables provide insights that seem to be potentially 
valuable. Some aspects of family composition (youth, parent_granparents) and education 
show a positive correlation. At first, the magnitude of such an effect appears higher for 
tertiary education, while it significantly lows as an effect of the progressive inclusion of 
covariates (model (3)(4)). A positive correlation is also found for the couple and child_in_
hh variables. However, while the latter is statistically significant only in the specification 
(3), (4) and (5), couple loses statistical significance due to covariates’ inclusion. The eco-
nomic controls suggest that the worse the current economic situation, the lower individual 
SWD. A recent worsening of a household’s financial condition (worse_householdeconomy) 
has a negative and statistically significant correlation with the dependent variable. At the 
same time, an increasingly positive impact on SWD is correlated with the more effortless 
spending ability. It is worth noting that worse_householdeconomy loses statistical signifi-
cance when trust is included in the analysis, confirming the role played by trust in counter-
acting feelings of economic threats during the pandemic (Kritzinger et al., 2021). Receiv-
ing sick leave support or other forms of support has a positive correlation with satisfaction 
with democracy. Wage support and payment support have a positive effect, but statistical 
significance is observed only in specification (1).
Meanwhile, the reception of support measures for unemployment appears to be nega-
tive and statistically significant. Measures_fair and measures_destinatary report p-values 
below commonly-used thresholds. A final point concerns the effects of trust variables, 
which, consistently with recent literature (Bol et al., 2020), register a high impact on SWD 
in times of COVID-19 too. In specification (4), trust_health and trust_gov show a highly 
statistically significant positive ceteris paribus correlation with the dependent variable 
(p < 0.001). As already been highlighted, when such controls are included in the estima-
tions, the size of the effects of pessimistic expectations about economic prospects is mean-
ingfully reduced compared to previous specifications. This result is in line with the rallying 
around the flag effect in times of Covid-19 (Bækgaard et al., 2020).
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4.3  Expectations about future economic prospects and current economic 
conditions
To test H2, in model (5) we check how respondents’ expectations about future economic 
prospects correlate with SWD at different levels of spending_ability. Such an analysis is 
carried out by using a specification where the two covariates interact. To correctly evaluate 
the impact of the two interacting terms, looking at the resulting marginal effects is essential 
(Brambor et  al., 2006). Figure 2 shows how the worse and the same expectations about 
future economic prospects affect low (a), medium (b), and high (c) levels of SWD at dif-
ferent levels of spending ability. The effect of these expectations is calculated as compared 
with the better expectations about future economic prospects (which is the base category).
The results seem to suggest that having pessimistic economic prospects decreases 
(increases) the probability of being highly (poorly) satisfied with democracy especially 
among those who are placed at the extremes of the spending ability scale, i.e., among those 
who have great economic difficulty and those who make ends meet very easily. This find-
ing is partially consistent with H2 that predicted an effect of bad economic prospects only 
among the poorest people.
5  Discussion and conclusion
Our empirical analysis supports the idea that citizens’ expectations about future economic 
prospects are correlated with SWD (H1). According to our findings, and in line with pre-
vious literature (Loveless & Binelli, 2020; Nadeau et al., 2019), when citizens have pes-
simistic (optimistic) expectations about their future economic status, they are less (more) 
satisfied with democracy.
These findings are particularly relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic that has pro-
foundly shaped citizens’ economic expectations (Fetzer et al., 2020). Indeed, our analyses 
suggest that any effect on expectations of future economic deterioration is likely to matter 
for SWD. In this perspective, in the aftermath of the outbreak, governing authorities should 
pay greater attention to the political attitudes of those individuals.
The effect of expectations on SWD does not seem to occur uniformly across the total 
citizenry. Instead, it appears to be particularly evident among those at the extremes of the 
spending ability distribution. This means that disappointment with democracy can be par-
ticularly hard among the marginalized people, who risk being trapped in their negative eco-
nomic perceptions if no actions are taken to improve their expectations, and among rich 
people that believe to be severely hit by the pandemic. In line with Nadeau et al., (2019, p. 
1083), we confirm that the strength of the effect of economic prospects on SWD “depends 
on one’s place on the socioeconomic ladder”. However, we further advance the literature 
by demonstrating that economic expectations play a significant role in explaining SWD, 
especially for more indigent and wealthier citizens. This result provides an interesting con-
tribution to the literature exploring the political consequences of the COVID-19 crisis by 
evidencing a possible characterization of people’s reactions to disease-related economic 
threats.
Our analysis also adds further insights to the general discussion on possible procedural 
inputs and outputs conditioning SWD by shedding additional light on the main potential 
factors behind different individuals’ support across countries in times of shocks (Bol et al., 
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2020; Naumann et al., 2020; Vlachová, 2019). All in all, the study suggests that the capac-
ity to ensure people’s satisfaction with the performance of democracy might depend on 
governments’ ability to intercept the needs of the population, which are not homogeneous 
but stratified based on their ability to withstand economic shocks.
Funding Open access funding provided by Università degli Studi Roma Tre within the CRUI-CARE 
Agreement.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Altiparmakis, A., Bojar, A., Brouard, S., Foucault, M., Kriesi, H., & Nadeau, R. (2021). Pandemic politics: 
Policy evaluations of government responses to COVID-19. West European Politics, pp. 1–21.
Bækgaard, M., Christensen, J., Madsen, J. K., & Mikkelsen, K. S. (2020). Rallying around the flag in times 
of Covid-19: Societal lockdown and trust in democratic institutions. Journal of Behavioral Public 
Administration. https:// doi. org/ 10. 30636/ jbpa. 32. 172
Bellucci, P., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2011). A stable popularity function? Cross-national analysis. European 
Journal of Political Research, 50(2), 190–211. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/j. 1475- 6765. 2010. 01926.x
Benabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The POUM hypoth-
esis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447–487.
Bol, D., Giani, M., Blais, A., & Loewen, P. J. (2020). The effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on political sup-
port: Some good news for democracy? European Journal of Political Research, 60(2), 497–505.
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical 
analyses. Political Analysis, 14(1), 63–82.
Chang, W. C. (2018). Media use and satisfaction with democracy: Testing the role of political interest. 
Social Indicators Research, 140(3), 999–1016.
Christmann, P., & Torcal, M. (2017). The political and economic causes of satisfaction with democracy in 
Spain–a twofold panel study. West European Politics, 40(6), 1241–1266.
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press.
Daoust, J. F., & Nadeau, R. (2020). Context matters: Economics, politics and satisfaction with democracy. 
Electoral Studies. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. elect stud. 2020. 102133
Devine, D., Gaskell, J., Jennings, W., & Stoker, G. (2020). ‘Trust and the Coronavirus Pandemic: What are 
the Consequences of and for trust? Political Studies Review: An Early Review of the Literature’.
Fetzer, T., Hensel, L., Hermle, J., & Roth, C. (2020). Coronavirus perceptions and economic anxiety. Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 19, 1–36.
Flinders, M. (2020). Democracy and the politics of coronavirus: Trust, blame and understanding. Parlia-
mentary Affairs., 74(2), 483–502.
Hobolt, S. B. (2012). Citizen satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. JCMS: Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, 50(1), 8–105.
Kriesi, H. (2020). ‘Is there a crisis of democracy in Europe? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 61, 237–60.
Kritzinger, S., Foucault, M., Lachat, R., Partheymüller, J., Plescia, C., & Brouard, S. (2021). Rally round 
the flag: the COVID-19 crisis and trust in the national government (pp. 1–27). West European Politics.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2006). Does economics still matter? Econometrics and the vote. The Journal of Politics, 
68(1), 208–212.
Lewis-Beck, M. S., Nadeau, R., & Elias, A. (2008). Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and 
panel data. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 84–95. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/j. 1540- 5907. 
2007. 00300.x
Expectations About Future Economic Prospects and Satisfaction…
1 3
Linde, J., & Ekman, J. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in com-
parative politics. European Journal of Political Research, 42(3), 391–408.
Lipset, S. M. (1994). The social requisites of democracy revisited. American Sociological Review, 59, 1–22.
Loveless, M., & Binelli, C. (2020). Economic expectations and satisfaction with democracy: Evidence from 
Italy. Government and Opposition, 55(3), 413–429.
Mann, F. D., Krueger, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2020). Personal economic anxiety in response to COVID-19. 
Personality and Individual Differences. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. paid. 2020. 110233
Nadeau, R., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2001). National economic voting in U.S. presidential elections. Journal 
of Politics, 63(1), 159–181. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/ 0022- 3816. 00063
Nadeau, R., Arel-Bundock, V., & Daoust, J. F. (2019). Satisfaction with democracy and the American 
dream. The Journal of Politics, 81(3), 1080–1084.
Naumann, E., Möhring, K., Reifenscheid, M., Wenz, A., Rettig, T., Lehrer, R., & Cornesse, C. (2020). 
COVID-19 policies in Germany and their social, political, and psychological consequences. European 
Policy Analysis., 6(2), 191–202.
Quaranta, M., & Martini, S. (2016). Does the economy really matter for satisfaction with democracy? Lon-
gitudinal and cross-country evidence from the European Union. Electoral Studies, 42, 164–174.
Quaranta, M., & Martini, S. (2017). Easy come, easy go? Economic performance and satisfaction with 
democracy in Southern Europe in the last three decades. Social Indicators Research, 131(2), 659–680.
Sandor, E. (2020). Living, working and COVID-19: Codebook for Round 1 and 2 datasets (release 
20.10.2020). Eurofound Working Paper No. WPEF20025. Retrieved from https:// www. eurof ound. 
europa. eu/ sites/ defau lt/ files/ wpef2 0025. pdf
Sandor, E., & Ahrendt, D. (2020). Living, working and COVID-19: Methodological Annex to Round 2. 
Eurofound Working Paper No. WPEF20023. Retrieved from https:// www. eurof ound. europa. eu/ publi 
catio ns/ report/ 2020/ living- worki ng- and- covid- 19# tab- 03
Schraff, D. (2020). Political trust during the Covid-19 pandemic: Rally around the flag or lockdown effects? 
European Journal of Political Research American Sociological Review, 59(1), 1–22.
Vlachová, K. (2019). Lost in transition, found in recession? Satisfaction with democracy in Central Europe 
before and after economic crises. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 52(3), 227–234.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
